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This paper examines the impact of recent state-level Medicaid policy changes that expanded eligibility
for family planning services to higher income women and to Medicaid clients whose benefits would
expire otherwise.  We begin by establishing that the income-based policy change led to a substantial
increase in the number of program recipients.  We then examine Vital Statistics birth data from 1990
to 2003 and determine that it also reduced overall births to non-teens by about two percent and to teens
by over four percent.  Our estimates suggest a nearly nine percent reduction in births to women age
20-44 made eligible by the policy change.  We supplement our state-level analysis with an investigation
of individual-level data from the 1988, 1995, and 2002 National Surveys of Family Growth (NSFG)
to examine the impact of these policies on sexual behavior and contraceptive use. Evidence from this
analysis suggests that the reduction in fertility associated with raising income thresholds for eligibility
was accomplished via greater use of contraception. Our calculations indicate that allowing higher income
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Roughly  one-third  of  all  births  between  1997  and  2002  in  the  United  States  were 
unintended by the mother based on data available from the National Center for Health Statistics 
(2005).
1  This rate skyrockets to almost three-quarters for births to teens.  A popular response to 
such jarring statistics is to increase access to family planning services that can help provide the 
means necessary to reduce unintended childbearing.  In fact, a 2006 public opinion poll found 
that 89 percent of American adults believe that people “should have more access to information 
about birth control options,” and 81 percent believe that “providing people with access to birth 
control is a good way to prevent abortions” (Wall Street Journal Online, 2006). 
On its face it might seem obvious that providing contraception to women will reduce the 
number of unwanted pregnancies and births.  Of course, behavioral responses to policy changes 
are rarely so straightforward.  Women may choose not to take advantage of the services and 
many who do would have obtained contraception privately otherwise. Women may also increase 
their  level  of  sexual  activity,  canceling  out  the  effectiveness  of  any  increased  use  of 
contraception. Ultimately, the impact on behavior is an empirical question.   
In  this  paper,  we  provide  evidence  on  this  point  by  examining  recent  expansions  of 
eligibility for Medicaid family planning services to women who would not otherwise be covered.  
Between  December  1993  and  March  2007,  25  states  received  waivers  from  the  federal 
government  to  extend  this  coverage  (Guttmacher  Institute,  2007a).    We  evaluate  the 
effectiveness of these waivers in reducing births, as well as their impact on abortions, sexual 
activity, and contraceptive use.  Because these policies were introduced in different states at 
different  times,  we  are  able  to  employ  quasi-experimental  methods  to  identify  a  causal 
                                                 
1 The concept and measurement of an unintended pregnancy are somewhat controversial (cf. Santelli, 2003), so this 
statistic should be interpreted with some caution.    
2 
connection.  We implement these methods using a wide array of data sources, including Vital 
Statistics birth data, abortion data from the Guttmacher Institute and microdata from the 1988, 
1995,  and  2002  National  Surveys  of  Family  Growth  (NSFG)  regarding  sexual  activity  and 
contraceptive use.  We also confirm that these waivers increased the number of women receiving 
Medicaid-funded  family  planning  services  using  data  from  the  Centers  for  Medicaid  and 
Medicare Services (CMS).  
The  results  of  our  analysis  show  that  one  type  of  these  waivers,  those  that  increase 
income  limits  for  eligibility,  were  particularly  effective.    We  show  that  these  policies 
dramatically  increased  the  number  of  women  receiving  Medicaid-funded  family  planning 
services.  We go on to demonstrate that they reduced overall births to non-teens by about two 
percent and to teens by over four percent. Scaling these estimates by the estimated proportion of 
women in a state made eligible, we find that births to newly-eligible non-teens fell by almost 
nine percent.  Our analysis of individual-level data from the NSFG implies that the reduction in 
fertility associated with income-based waivers is attributable to greater contraceptive use; we 
find no evidence of an  effect on sexual activity.  Based on the cost per recipient of family 
planning services, we find that each birth avoided cost on the order of $6,800.   
II. BACKGROUND  
A. Literature Review 
Though advocacy groups, politicians, and much of the public appears to be optimistic 
about the potential to decrease rates of unwanted births and abortions by expanding access to 
contraception, there is very little empirical evidence to date supporting this notion. Kirby (1997 
and 2001) provides two extensive reviews of the literature on the effectiveness of teen pregnancy 
prevention  programs  in  the  United  States,  focusing  on  experimental  and  quasi-experimental  
3 
analyses.
2    Although  his  1997  review  concludes  that  “there  is  remarkably  little  research 
evidence” to support the conclusion that family planning services prevent teen pregnancies, his 
2001  review  is  somewhat  more  optimistic.    There  he  reports  some  evidence  that  programs 
offering a large number of services, including family planning, may be effective. DiCenso, et al. 
(2002) provides a similar review of programs like this in a larger set of developed countries.  
They conclude that the types of programs “evaluated to date do not delay the initiation of sexual 
intercourse, improve use of birth control among young men and women, or reduce the number of 
pregnancies in young women.” Paton (2002) uses quasi-experimental methods to examine the 
impact of a policy implemented in the United Kingdom in which parental consent was required 
before family planning services could be provided to those under the age of 16. He finds no 
evidence  that  this  restriction  on  family  planning  access  had  any  impact  on  pregnancies  or 
abortions.
3 
The  Medicaid  expansion  policy  that  we  evaluate  differs  from  previously  reviewed 
“pregnancy prevention” programs in that it was not limited to teenagers. It was broad-based, 
affecting  women  in  multiple  states  and  varied  locales,  as  opposed  to  a  single  community 
initiative aimed at reducing pregnancy among a very specific teen population. Furthermore, the 
policy change is specifically about expanded access to family planning services, as opposed to a 
range of services including educational or job training.  Finally, the waivers were directed at 
women who were not at the very bottom of the income distribution. On the one hand, such 
women may be more responsive to such interventions. On the other hand, they may be more 
                                                 
2 There also have been previous studies examining the relationship between geographic measures of contraceptive 
access and sexual outcomes (cf. Lundberg and Plotnick, 1990; Mellor, 1998; and Averett, et al., 2002).  In general, 
these studies differ from ours in emphasis and scope and, furthermore, the sources of identifying variation are 
arguably not independent of the demand for contraception.  
3  There  is  a  substantial  literature  on  the  relationship  between  contraceptive  access  and  fertility  in  developing 
countries (cf . Gertler and Molyneaux, 1994 and 2000, and Pritchett, 1994). The baseline fertility rates and previous 
exposure to contraception in many of these countries is so different from that in the U.S. that it is unreasonable to 
expect the results from this literature to generalize to the U.S. context.   
4 
likely  to  have  been  using  contraception  previously,  paid  for  either  through  a  private  health 
insurance employer or out-of-pocket. Therefore, past evidence does not adequately inform the 
issue of the effectiveness of the Medicaid family planning expansions. 
Going back further in time provides an example of expanded contraceptive access that 
has  had  a  significant  impact  on  women’s  fertility.    Recent  evidence  has  examined  the 
introduction of the birth control pill in 1960 and the laws which regulated teens’ access to it 
through the 1960s and 1970s.  Bailey (2006) reports that as states relaxed restrictions on teens’ 
ability to obtain the pill, the likelihood of experiencing a first birth by age 22 fell by 16 percent.  
Although this intervention is considerably different than that which we explore, it does suggest 
that it is possible for greater contraceptive access to reduce fertility. 
  To  date,  only  one  study  of  which  we  are  aware  (Edwards,  et  al.,  2003,  which  was 
reported in Gold, 2004) has explored the impact of Medicaid family planning waivers directly.  
This  study  examines  the  impact  of  family  planning  waivers  granted  to  six  states,  but  it  has 
serious  methodological  weaknesses.  In  particular,  the  authors  estimate  the  number  of  births 
averted based upon the deviation from pre-waiver birth levels within each state; no control group 
is used to provide an idea of what would have happened to birth rates in the state had no waiver 
been granted.  Our study corrects this methodological flaw using quasi-experimental methods to 
examine the impact on births, as well as examining all antecedent behavior. 
B. Institutional Details 
Historically, the main source of public support for family planning services in the United 
States has been Title X of the Public Health Service Act (commonly referred to as Title X), 
introduced in 1970.  This program is still an important source of public funds for family planning  
5 
services, but its budget has shrunk considerably in real terms over the past couple of decades.
4    
The Medicaid system has also provided access to family planning services to its clients since 
1972, but the stringent eligibility requirements to receive Medicaid meant that historically only 
the very low-income and only women with children had access to these services. A series of 
expansions  in  the  1980s  extended  eligibility  for  pregnancy-related  care,  including  family 
planning services for 60 days post-partum.
5   
Between  1994  and  2001,  federal  Medicaid  spending  on  family  planning  more  than 
doubled, increasing from $332 million to $770 million.  It rose from 46 percent of total federal 
spending on family planning to 61 percent. During this time the federal government allowed 
states  to  implement  programs  that  offer  family  planning  services  to  women  whose  incomes 
would have been too high under the existing Medicaid program or to women who otherwise 
would have lost Medicaid eligibility, typically post-partum.
6 These waivers allow states to offer 
the full range of family planning services it offers to its regular Medicaid recipients to additional 
women. Family planning services provided include a full range of contraceptive methods as well 
as associated examinations and laboratory tests. The federal government reimburses the state 
Medicaid program for 90 percent of these services and supplies. States may include other related 
care in their package of benefits, including treatment for STDs, but these services are reimbursed 
by the federal government at the regular rate, which ranges from 50 percent to 76 percent of cost 
                                                 
4 Other sources of public funding are the Federal Social Services Block Grant, the federal Maternal and Child Health 
(MCH) Block Grant, the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program, and state funds, including 
funds from the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (S-CHIP).  Title X and Medicaid represent the largest 
share of total federal expenditures. 
5 In addition, adolescents have had access to family planning services through the State Children’s Health Insurance 
Program (SCHIP), which was implemented in the late 1990s.  Despite the coverage of family planning provided by 
SCHIP, Gold and Sonfield (2001) report that the take-up rate of this provision among adolescents is quite low, in 
part because of the lack of confidentiality in their provision. 
6 To obtain a Medicaid family planning  waiver from the  federal government, a state must demonstrate budget 
neutrality.  Waiver  applications  typically  show  this  by  estimating  the  number  of  women  who  will  be  served, 
simulating the reduction in births that will result (i.e. multiplying the number served by estimates of the efficacy of 
contraception), and then calculating savings in areas like Medicaid payments for births and welfare payments.  
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(Frost, Sonfield, and Gold 2006). Seventeen states cover abortion under their Medicaid program, 
but federal funds may not be used for abortion and hence abortion services are not provided 
under these waiver provisions.  
Beginning with South Carolina in 1993 and most recently with Texas at the end of 2006, 
25 states have applied for and received waivers to extend eligibility for these family planning 
services to women who would not otherwise be covered. Table 1 lists the provisions enacted in 
each state along with the dates they were approved and implemented. Eight states currently have 
waiver policies in place to extend coverage to women who would otherwise lose the 60-day 
postpartum coverage of family planning services.  Two other states extend coverage of family 
planning  services  for  up  to  two  years  and  five  years  for  women  who  would  lose  Medicaid 
eligibility  for  any  reason,  not  just  post-partum.    For  the  remainder  of  this  analysis,  we  will 
collectively refer to these two types as duration waivers.  An additional 17 states have been 
granted waivers to extend Medicaid family planning services based solely on income, regardless 
of categorical eligibility requirements (e.g. having a dependent child); this income threshold is 
set to 133 percent of the federal poverty line in one state, 185 percent of the federal poverty line 
in eight states, and to 200 percent of the poverty line in the remaining seven states. We refer to 
these 17 policies as income-based waivers.  Both South Carolina’s and New York’s waivers 
extend  coverage  to  both  women  losing  eligibility  post  partum  as  well  as  women  under  the 
income threshold.     
III. THE IMPACT OF WAIVERS ON THE NUMBER OF PUBLIC FAMILY PLANNING RECIPIENTS 
Before examining the impact of waivers on fertility outcomes, we undertake an analysis 
to determine whether the policy change increased the number of women who received Medicaid  
7 
family planning services.  If more people are not going through the front door of the Medicaid-
funded family planning provider, then it is unlikely that the program had any behavioral effects. 
Although  this  is  a  useful  first  step  in  our  analysis,  it  is  important  to  consider  two 
important limitations in interpreting its results:  crowd out and spillover.  Crowd-out refers to the 
possibility  that  some  women  who  receive  family  planning  services  through  the  Medicaid 
program after the waiver would have used privately provided family planning services in the 
absence of a waiver.  This merely changes the form of payment, not the services provided, and 
should have no behavioral impact.  Spillover refers to the possibility that the introduction of a 
waiver increases program awareness and increases visibility of family planning clinics, which 
increases  the  take-up  of  services  among  women  who  were  previously  eligible  for  Medicaid 
family planning services but not receiving them.  In this instance we might see an increase in 
contraceptive use and a corresponding fertility response that is greater than that due to newly-
eligible women alone.  Identifying the impact of the policy on overall contraceptive use in light 
of both crowd out and spillover issues would require data on all women’s use of family planning 
services; unfortunately no such data are available.   
Instead we make use of publicly-available data from the Medicaid Statistical Information 
System (MSIS) of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the basic source of 
state-submitted eligibility and claims data on the Medicaid population. State-by-state tables are 
available for fiscal  years 1999 to 2002 that contain information on the number of Medicaid 
beneficiaries with family planning claims. We obtained comparable data for the years 1992 and 
1998 from the older national HFCA-2082 tables.
7 Finding an effect on service receipt from these 
                                                 
7 We are grateful to Kosali Simon for sharing these data with us.  These aggregated statistics are not available 
separately for teens. A visual inspection of these data indicated a handful of data points which clearly represent 
errors.  States with a steady state positive value of recipients suddenly equal zero or very near zero and then revert to 
values comparable to the earlier values.  We chose to recode as missing all states where the proportion of women  
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data is a necessary, but not sufficient condition in identifying any behavioral effects that may 
have resulted from the introduction of the waivers. 
We  use  these  data  to  estimate  a  simple  Ordinary  Least  Squares  regression  of  the 
proportion of women 15-44 receiving Medicaid family planning services on indicator variables 
for the implementation of income-based and duration-based waivers along with state and year 
fixed  effects.    In  its  simplest  form,  this  approach  is  equivalent  to  a  difference-in-difference 
estimator. We also add to these regressions a full set of control variables (described in more 
detail  subsequently),  holding  constant  other  state-level  policy  changes  and  changes  in 
demographic  characteristics  of  state  populations  over  time.    Finally,  we  experiment  with 
alternative forms of trends within states over time, including no state-specific trends as well as 
linear and quadratic state-specific trends. 
Table 2 reports the results of this analysis. Column 1 provides the 1992 (prior to any 
waiver) values of the proportion of women 15-44 receiving Medicaid family planning services in 
states that implemented income and duration waivers by 2002 (the last year of data availability).  
The results indicate that 4.6 and 3.7 percent of women were receiving those services in the two 
respective  types  of  states.    These  estimates  provide  a  reference  point  to  help  interpret  the 
magnitude of the results from this regression analysis. 
 The regression estimates reported in the remainder of the table provide clear evidence 
that income-based waivers increased the number of women receiving family planning services 
through the Medicaid program.  The coefficient estimates from all three specifications indicate 
that the number of recipients increased tremendously, on the order of 2 to 3 times depending 
                                                                                                                                                             
15-44 receiving Medicaid family planning services fell below .05 percent.  We also tested the sensitivity to the 




upon specification, in response to an income-based waiver.  Later in the paper we describe a 
procedure for estimating the percentage of the female population ages 20-44 that would be newly 
eligible for Medicaid family planning services under these waivers and obtain an average figure 
across states of 22.5 percent.  Combining the results here of a 5 to 10 percentage point increase 
in  the  share  of  the  population  receiving  Medicaid  family  planning  services,  this  implies  an 
average take-up rate was in the vicinity of 22 to 44 percent among those whose eligibility was 
affected by the policy.  
Once state trends are added, duration based waivers also are estimated to have a modest 
impact on benefit receipt, but these estimates are not statistically significant.  Given the size of 
the estimates, we interpret these results as ruling out large effects, but not ruling out something 
less than that.   
We  conclude  from  this  analysis  that  we  have  at  least  established  a  basis  to  further 
examine  the  impact  of  these  policy  changes,  and  particularly  income-based  waivers,  on 
behavioral outcomes.  The potential for crowd-out of privately-funded contraceptive use means 
that the increase in the number of Medicaid family planning recipients need not have led to any 
change in contraceptive behavior or fertility outcomes. This is an empirical question that we 
address subsequently.   
IV. ESTIMATING THE IMPACT ON BIRTHS AND ABORTIONS  
A. Econometric Methodology 
To investigate the impact of expanded eligibility for Medicaid family planning services 
on births and abortions, we use quasi-experimental methods exploiting the variation across states 
in the timing of program implementation, as detailed in Table 1.  Specifically, we begin our 
analysis by estimating Ordinary Least Squares regression models of the form:   
10 
    0 1 2 3 ln ( . ) ( . ) st st st st s t st Y inc waiver dur waiver X b b b b g g e = + + + + + +   (1) 
In this model, Yst is defined alternatively as the birth or abortion rate in state s at time t. 
The regressors of interest, inc. waiverst and dur. waiverst, equal 1 if an income-based or duration-
based  Medicaid  family  planning  waiver  is  implemented  in  state  s  at  time  t  and  equals  0 
otherwise.
8    We  modify  this  specification  to  include  state-specific  linear  and  quadratic  time 
trends to control for the possibility of a spurious correlation between the introduction of waivers 
and  trends  in  fertility  outcomes  across  states.    All  regressions  are  weighted  by  the  state 
population for the relevant population subgroup.
9 
It  is  also  important  that  these  regressions  control  for  other  observable  state-specific 
factors that might have changed over time, including other relevant policy changes.  During the 
period  we  focus  on,  these  include  important  changes  to  abortion  restrictions  (parental 
notification/consent,  waiting  periods,  and  Medicaid  funding  of  abortion),  the  welfare  system 
(maximum AFDC/TANF benefit for a family of three, a welfare reform indicator, and a “family 
cap” indicator), and other Medicaid policies (an indicator for “S-CHIP” implementation).
10  In 
addition,  a  number  of  states  introduced  mandates  requiring  health  insurance  coverage  of 
contraception.  We include indicator variables representing whether or not these policies were in 
place in each state/year.
11  In addition, we include the state unemployment rate to control for 
differences in local labor market conditions that may affect women’s decisions/opportunity cost 
                                                 
8 In the year in which the waiver was passed the regressors are equal to a fraction between (0,1) based on the number 
of months the waiver was in effect. 
9 All models are estimated both with and without weighting; results are qualitatively similar across models.   
10 See  Levine (2004) for a description of abortion law changes.  Information on  welfare reform policies  were 
obtained from three sources: (1) a technical report of the Council of Economic Advisers (1999); (2) an Urban 
Institute  report  written  by  Gallagher,  et  al.  (1998);  and  (3)  a  report  by  Crouse  (1999),  prepared  for  the  U.S. 
Department  of  Health  and  Human  Services,  which  summarizes  information  contained  in  a  report  of  the  U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services (1997).  S-CHIP implementation dates were obtained from the CMS 
website <http://www.cms.hhs.gov/schip/enrollment/fy2000.pdf>, accessed September 2005. Data on welfare benefit 
levels were obtained from Council of Economic Advisers (1997) and Rowe, et al., (2004), Rowe and Russell (2004), 
and Rowe and Versteeg (2005).  
11 We are grateful to Adam Sonfield at the Guttmacher Institute for providing us with data on these policies.  
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regarding having children.  Finally these regressions include a set of the average demographic 
characteristics,  including  the  age  and  race  composition,  educational  attainment,  and  marital 
status of women in the state/year.
12   
  We estimate this equation separately for teens and for non-teens as well as for population 
subgroups  distinguished  by  age,  race/ethnicity,  and  educational  attainment.    Our  set  of 
“treatment  states”  is  comprised  of  the  seven  states  that  implemented  income-based  waivers 
(Alabama, Arkansas, California, New Mexico, Oregon, South Carolina, and Washington) and 
duration-based waivers (Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Maryland, Missouri, New York,  Rhode 
Island, and South Carolina) during our sample period.
13  For models including only teens, we 
drop observations from Alabama and New Mexico because the waiver policies in these states 
explicitly excluded females under the age of 19.
14 
B. Data 
  We use several sources of data to estimate these models, where the different data sources 
are necessary to capture different components of fertility-related behavior.  For births, we use 
Vital  Statistics  natality  data  aggregated  to  the  state-level.  These  birth  data  are  very  well 
measured in the aggregate as well as for several population subgroups, including by state of 
residence, age, race/ethnicity, and educational attainment.
15  The Census Bureau also provides 
                                                 
12 We estimated these variables using data from the outgoing rotation group files from the Current Population 
Survey, available from the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
13 Both New York and Virginia implemented their waivers in the last quarter of the final year in the sample period 
and are not considered treatment states for the purpose of this discussion or figures; in the regressions the waiver 
indicator associated with the state observation is set equal to 0.25 in the final year. 
14  One  important  consideration  in  quasi-experimental  analyses  like  this  is  the  potential  for  policy  endogeneity 
(Besley and Case,  2000).  In this case, one might expect that locations having greater trouble with unwanted 
pregnancies  may  be  more  likely  to  adopt  more  aggressive  family  planning  policies.    The  bias  in  such  an 
environment, however, would go in the direction of finding a positive relationship between, say, teen childbearing 
and family planning, not a negative one, as we are finding.  Moreover, in our subsequent analysis of contraceptive 
use, we introduce a triple-difference identification strategy using those who are ineligible as an in-state control 
group.  This approach should reduce the likelihood that policy endogeneity is driving our results. 
15 Vital Statistics data on births are also available by maternal marital status, but these data are not reliably measured 
due to the imputation of marital status, often based on the last names of the parents, in some states and changes in  
12 
population estimates by state/year by age, gender, and race/ethnicity, so we can combine these 
two  sources  of  data  to  generate  birth  rates  for  these  subgroups.    We  use  data  on  weeks  of 
gestation  to  convert  the  dating  of  births  from  their  year  of  occurrence  to  the  year  of  their 
conception.
16    We  start  with  births  that  occur  in  1990  through  2003  (the  most  recent  year 
available at the time we began this study) and convert them to births that were conceived in 1990 
through 2002.  All other explanatory variables are merged onto these data to correspond to the 
year of conception. 
Data on abortions come from the Guttmacher Institute.  Their abortion data is obtained 
from surveys of abortion providers, inquiring about the number of procedures performed in the 
past year (or in the year before that).  These data are generally recognized as the most accurate 
available.  Abortion counts are recorded by the location of the provider, however, not the state of 
residence of the women having abortions.  The Guttmacher Institute takes advantage of other 
available data from the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) to generate abortion counts by state 
of residence.  CDC data tends to provide an undercount of the number of abortions provided,
17 
but those data include information on the state of occurrence of the abortion and the state of 
residence of the woman.  Guttmacher uses these data to transform their occurrence-based data to 
residence-based data; we use those data in our analysis.
18  During our sample period, they are 
available for 1991, 1992, 1996, 1999, and 2000.  Similarly, for teen abortions Guttmacher has 
adopted a set of assumptions designed to create a set of estimated teen abortion rates by state of 
                                                                                                                                                             
the method of recording marital status during the sample period (see the 1997 Technical Appendix from the Vital 
Statistics of the United States: Natality).  Due to this limitation, we have chosen to omit an analysis using these data. 
16 The weeks of  gestation variable contains some  missing  data.  For those births  missing this information,  we 
assumed that the pregnancy lasted 40 weeks, which was the modal value in these data. 
17 AGI abortion counts average 15 percent higher than those obtained by CDC (Alan Guttmacher Institute, 1997).   
18 These data have been graciously provided to us by Stanley Henshaw at AGI.    
13 
residence for the years 1992, 1996, 1999, and 2000 (Henshaw, 1997; Henshaw and Feivelson, 
2000; and Guttmacher Institute, 2006); we use these data as well.   
C. Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics regarding national trends in births and abortions can be found in 
published sources.  For all women of childbearing age, the birth rate fell slightly in the early 
1990s, but has been reasonably stable since then (Martin, 2005).  The abortion rate, on the other 
hand, has fallen steadily over the period (Finer and Henshaw, 2003).  In 1991, 26.3 abortions 
were performed for every 1,000 women of childbearing age (15-44), but that level fell to 21.3 in 
2000 (the latest year for which Guttmacher Institute data are available).  For teens, the birth rate 
in the U.S. has fallen dramatically since the early 1990s, starting that decade at over 60 births per 
1,000 women aged 15-19 and falling to a rate of 41.6 in 2003 (Guttmacher Institute, 2006).  At 
the same time, the teen abortion rate has fallen from 35.2 abortions per 1,000 women aged 15-19 
in 1992 to a rate of 24.0 in 2000.   
Note  that  this  is  the  period  that  waivers  were  introduced.  Of  course,  it  would  be 
premature  to  draw  any  conclusions  from  these  aggregated  statistics  regarding  whether  these 
patterns  of  behavior  could  be  attributed  to  the  expansion  of  eligibility  for  Medicaid  family 
planning services in particular states.  We turn our attention to an econometric analysis of this 
question in the following section. 
D. Results 
Before reporting the results of our full econometric analysis, we begin with Figures 1 and 
2, which displays trends in birth rates for all non-teens and teens, respectively, for states that are  
14 
distinguished by their waiver status.
19  In Figure 1 we see that birth rates for non-teens in states 
with no waivers have been trending upward relative to the levels in the two types of waiver 
states.  These differential patterns start before any waivers were introduced and highlight the 
importance  of  holding  constant  state  trends.  The  observed  pattern  also  suggests  that  the 
underlying trend is potentially best described by a quadratic functional form. There does not 
seem to be any dramatic decline in birth rates among non-teens in waiver states in later years 
relative to the non-waiver states.  This does not rule out the existence of a treatment effect, but it 
does suggest that any such effect is unlikely to be very large at an aggregate level.  Birth rates for 
teens (Figure 2), on the other hand, appear to have dipped in states that implemented income-
based waivers in the middle of our sample period.  This large decline precedes the waivers 
introduced in Arkansas, California, and South Carolina by a year or two and is unlikely to be 
attributable to the waiver directly.  Again, the differential trends across states highlight the need 
to control for this in the econometric models that we estimate. 
Table 3 reports estimates from regression models of the form of equation (1), where the 
dependent variable represents the log of the birth rate (top panel) and the log of the abortion rate 
(bottom panel). Results are presented for teens and non-teens separately for births and for teens 
and all women (mostly non-teens) for abortions.  We report models that include no state-specific 
linear trends as well as linear and quadratic trends to examine the sensitivity of the results to 
these alternative specifications.   
The results provide strong evidence that income-based family planning waivers reduce 
births, particularly for teens.  For teens and non-teens in models without state-specific trends, 
births are estimated to fall by about 7.1 percent and 5.3 percent, respectively.  As predicted 
                                                 
19 In these figures, we have treated New York and South Carolina as income-based waiver states based on our 
subsequent  analysis  indicating  that  income-based  waivers  had  a  much  larger  impact  on  the  number  of  family 
planning recipients than duration waivers.  
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earlier, including state trends reduces the size of the estimated effects to 4.7 percent and 1.7 
percent.  Quadratic trends have little impact on the estimates; these waivers are found to reduce 
births by 4.2 percent and 2.0 percent for teens and non-teens, respectively.   
The results for duration waivers are less robust. The point estimates are close to zero and 
statistically  insignificant  for  teens.  When  estimated  among  non-teens,  all  point  estimates  are 
negative, and are statistically significant for non-teens in models with no trends and linear state 
trends, but statistically insignificant in the model with quadratic state trends.  We believe that 
these findings are suggestive that these waivers might have an impact on reducing fertility for 
non-teens,  but  the  evidence  is  not  sufficient  to  strongly  support  that  conclusion.    For  the 
remainder of the analysis we focus more of our attention on income-based waivers.   
The bottom panel of Table 3 conducts similar analyses regarding abortion rates.  Because 
we have more data available for women 15-44 than we do for teens, we estimate models for 
women 15-44, rather than for non-teens, 20-44.  Data limitations, described earlier, reduce the 
sample size of available state/year cells relative to that in the birth regressions, particularly for 
teens.    The  results  of  this  analysis  provide  little  evidence  of  an  impact  on  abortion  rates 
attributable  to  the  introduction  of  a  family  planning  waiver.    The  problem  is  largely  about 
imprecision; standard errors of 10 percent or more suggest that the impact on abortion rates 
would have to be enormous before one could reject a null hypothesis of no effect.  For women 
15-44, standard errors are somewhat smaller, but they are still large enough that only very large 
effects  could  be  statistically  significant.    The  point  estimates  are  sensitive  to  empirical 
specification and never large enough to be significant.  This is not conclusive evidence that 
family planning waivers have little or no effect on abortions, but rather it indicates that we are 
unable find any evidence in support of such an effect.  
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Table  4  extends  our  analysis  of  the  impact  on  birth  rates  by  examining  different 
population subgroups (Columns 1 and 2).  All results reported here are based on specifications 
that include state-specific quadratic trends.  When women are differentiated by their age, we see 
that income-based waivers have the largest impact on women 18-19 and 20-24 years of age.   
Estimates for other age groups are not statistically significant.  By race, there are differences in 
point estimates for the impact of income-based waivers, but these differences are not statistically 
significant.   
The  bottom  panel  of  the  table  examines  births  to  women  with  different  levels  of 
educational attainment.  For this analysis, we use the natural log of the number of births to 
women in each category because we do not have relevant population numbers to create birth 
rates.  We also focus on women 20-44 because so many teens are still enrolled in school.
 20  The 
results  of  this  analysis  indicate  that  the  impact  of  income-based  waivers  decreases  with 
educational  attainment.    Because  eligibility  for  these  waivers  is  negatively  correlated  with 
educational attainment, as discussed subsequently, these findings provide additional support for 
the notion that our results are identifying a causal impact. 
The remainder of the table incorporates the fact that not all women are eligible for the 
benefits associated with, in particular, an income-based waiver.  Duration-based waivers are also 
targeted  at  particular  population  subgroups  (women  who  recently  had  a  child  and  would 
otherwise have to give up their benefits), but identifying those subgroups is very difficult in 
large-scale, publicly available data.  On the other hand, we are able to use microdata from the 
2000 Census to approximate the fraction of a state’s female population in different population 
                                                 
20 We also restricted the sample period used for this analysis to 1992-2001 because a few states do not have births by 
educational attainment recorded in the Vital Statistics data for 1990, 1991, and 2002.  
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subgroups  who  would  be  made  eligible  by  an  income-based  waiver.
21    We  can  use  these 
calculated eligibility rates to scale our earlier estimates of the impact of these waivers and arrive 
at a simulated impact on the eligible population.
22  We restrict this exercise to the population of 
women  20-44  because  it  is  not  clear  how  to  assign  eligibility  to  a  teen  based  on  recorded 
household income. 
The results of this analysis are reported in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4.  Column 3 reports 
the percentage of women estimated to be eligible for income-based waivers in each population 
subgroup (other than teens).  For all non-teens, income-based waivers increased the reach of 
Medicaid family planning services to additional 22.5 percent of the women.  This statistic ranged 
from 14 percent in the state of Washington to 42 percent in New Mexico.  Younger women, non-
white women, and less-educated women were considerably more likely to be eligible for benefits 
under  an  income-based  waiver.    Column  4  reports  the  ratio  of  the  coefficient  estimates  in 
Column 1 to the estimated percentage made eligible by an income-based waiver in Column 3.  
This  ratio  reflects  an  estimate  of  the  impact  of  the  waiver  on  the  eligible  population.    We 
estimate that births fell by almost nine among all eligible women and by up to 15 percent for 
women 20-24. 
                                                 
21 The eligibility calculations are based upon the eligibility criteria described in Broaddus, et al. (2002).  They begin 
by  determining  whether  a  woman’s  income  and  family  structure  would  enable  her  to  receive  Medicaid  in  the 
absence of a waiver and then calculates her income-based eligibility in the presence of the waiver.  Our eligibility 
measure is the increment to the fraction of women eligible in each waiver state. We make no pretense of thoroughly 
coding eligibility as a function of the complete set of state rules regarding detailed aspects of family income and 
asset holdings.  
22 An alternative approach would be to include in the regression an interaction term between estimated eligibility 
and the waiver indicator variable.  Our first attempt to do so included this interaction term along with the waiver 
indicator, but without any time-series variability in our eligibility measure, the results were not estimated with a 
great deal of precision.  Our second attempt included the interaction term without the waiver indicator.  The results 
of that analysis provided point estimates that were virtually identical to those we report in Column 4 with t-statistics 
very similar to those reported in Column 2.  Our view is that this exercise is doing little more than the scaling that 
we described and that reporting it this way is a more accurate description of our methods.  
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V. ESTIMATING THE IMPACT ON SEXUAL ACTIVITY AND CONTRACEPTIVE USE  
A. Econometric Methodology 
To investigate the impact of the expansion of eligibility for Medicaid family planning 
services  on  individual  behavior,  we  apply  quasi-experimental  methods  very  similar  to  those 
described  above  to  our  sample  of  women  from  the  NSFG.  We  specify  a  reduced-form 
relationship  between  the  implementation  of  waiver  policies  and  individual-level  outcomes. 
Specifically, we estimate linear probability models of the following form:
23   
  1 2 ( . ) ( . ) (1995) (2002) ist o st st s ist ist Y inc waiver dur waiver I I X f f f g e = + + + + + + +   (2) 
The dependent variable Yist is defined alternatively as an indicator for whether an individual 
engaged in sexual intercourse in the past three months, whether a sexually-active individual did 
not use birth control at last intercourse in the past three months, and whether an individual had 
unprotected  sex  in  the  past  three  months  (the  interaction  of  the  other  two  binary  outcome 
variables).  We  estimate  these  linear  probability  models  for  all  women  and  for  population 
subgroups. Estimated standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the state level. We weight all 
regressions by NSFG sampling weights. 
The X-vector includes indicators for age category, race/ethnicity, marital status, category 
of educational attainment, and whether the respondent has children. State level variables are 
mainly the same as those described earlier in our analysis using Vital Statistics data.
24  As before, 
in regressions run specifically for teenagers, we drop observations from the states of Alabama 
and New Mexico because the waiver policies in these states explicitly excluded females under 
the age of 19. 
                                                 
23 All results are qualitatively insensitive to the choice of linear probability models rather than probit models. 
24 Because we only have three years of data in the NSFG, we do not control for the full set of policies included in the 
state-level analysis, because there is not enough variation in some of these variables.  For example, every state in the 
data has an S-CHIP policy implemented by 2002 and none do in 1988 or 1995. This policy is thus completely 
characterized by the indicator variables for survey year.  
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We  can  also  augment  this  model  incorporating  a  woman’s  eligibility  status  for  an 
income-based waiver.
25  In contrast to our analysis of Vital Statistics data described earlier, with 
microdata we can estimate for each individual whether or not they would be eligible for this type 
of waiver and can interact this measure of eligibility with an income-based waiver indicator 
variable representing the status of the policy in each woman’s state/year of residence: 
 
1 2 3 ( . ) ( . ) ( . )
(1995) (2002)
ist o st st ist st
s ist ist
Y inc waiver inc waiver elig dur waiver
I I X
f f f f
g e
= + + × +
+ + + + +
          (3) 
In  this  formulation,  the  income-based  waiver  indicator  variable  holds  constant  other  broad 
factors  that  may  be  occurring  in  income-based  waiver  states  following  the  waiver  and  the 
interaction terms highlights whether or not the behavior of those directly affected by the waivers 
changes in response.  This is a triple-difference estimation strategy.  Because we are concerned 
about imputing eligibility for teens based on the difficulty of measuring their income, we use this 
approach for non-teens only.   
B. Data 
To examine sexual activity and contraceptive use, we use data from the 1988, 1995, and 
2002 cycles of the National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG). These surveys interviewed 8,450, 
10,847,  and  7,643  women  between  the  ages  of  14  and  45  in  the  three  survey  years, 
respectively.
26  The  samples  are  non-representative  in  that  they  over-sample  teens  and  other 
groups of women, but sampling weights are provided to correct for this.  State identifiers are 
                                                 
25  Conducting  a  similar  exercise  for  duration-based  waivers  is  complicated  by  the  complexity  of  predicting 
eligibility for waivers of this type.  To do so, one would need to know Medicaid coverage in the period following 
each birth (in states with post-partum based policies) and the woman’s income at that time to determine whether she 
would have had to go off of Medicaid without the waiver.  The NSFG does inquire about Medicaid coverage at the 
time of delivery of each child, but has no retrospective income measure.  Using current income as a proxy for 
income at the time of birth, we were only able to identify 50 women in these data whose deliveries were covered by 
Medicaid, whose current income would make her otherwise ineligible for family planning services after the post-
partum period expired, and whose most recent birth occurred in a state with a duration-based waiver in place at the 
time. As a result, we chose not to report an analysis incorporating simulated eligibility for a duration-based waiver. 
26 The 2002 survey also includes information on  men, but  with just one  year of data  and only cross-sectional 
methods available to us, we chose not to use these data.  
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required for this analysis and are not included on public use NSFG files, but they are available to 
researchers with permission from the National Center for Health Statistics.
27 
C. Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics regarding sexual activity and contraceptive use for all women and 
for teens for the years 1988, 1995, and 2002 are reported in Table 5.  These statistics update 
those reported in Levine (2001).  In 2002, 36 percent of teens and 72 percent of women age 15-
44 had sexual intercourse in the three months prior to the survey.  The large majority of sexually 
active women practice contraception; 17 percent of sexually-active teenagers and 24 percent of 
sexually active women failed to use contraception at their last intercourse.
28  Although levels of 
sexual activity are similar across racial/ethnic groups, there are very significant differences in 
rates of contraceptive use, particularly for teens. 
These  data  reveal  some  noteworthy  trends  in  sexual  behavior  and  contraceptive  use 
among teenagers over this time period. (There are no obvious trends among women age 15-44.)  
Rates of sexual activity have declined for all teens, particularly for black, non-Hispanic teens.  
Fewer teens fail to use contraception now than in the past, although Hispanics still have a higher 
rate of non-use in 2002 than they did in 1988.  With less sexual activity and more contraceptive 
use, it is not surprising that teen birth rates have been falling.  This is further borne out in the 
statistics showing that that fewer teens are both sexually active and not using contraception in the 
bottom panel of the table. 
D. Results:  Sexual Activity and Contraceptive Use 
Table 6 reports the estimated coefficients of interest from equation [2] for teens and non-
teens and equation [3] for non-teens only for the three dependent variables – sex in past three 
                                                 
27 All analyses using these state identifiers need to be performed in their Research Data Center in Hyattesville, MD.  
We thank Christopher Rogers for his assistance in using these data. 
28 Table A1 details the types of contraceptive methods that women in the 2002 NSFG used.  
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months, no birth control during last intercourse in the past three months, and unprotected sex in 
the past three months.  The results in the top panel (from equation [2]) for non-teens indicates 
that there was no statistically significant impact of the waivers on the likelihood of sex in the 
past three months, but that income-based waivers increased the likelihood of contraceptive use 
among sexual active women.  We are unable to conclude much regarding the behavior of teens 
alone because of the magnitude of the standard errors.   
The bottom panel of the table switches to a triple difference identification strategy that 
incorporates predicted eligibility for income-based waivers, as in equation [3].  For all non-teens, 
we see that there is little evidence suggesting that sexual activity is affected, but we continue to 
find evidence of increased use of contraception.  Over 5 percent fewer sexually active women 
failed  to  use  contraception  at  their  last  intercourse  and  3.5  percent  fewer  women  could  be 
identified as having unprotected sex in the past three months.
29  Both estimates are significant at 
the 5 percent level.  These results suggest that the reason that birth rates fell in response to 
income-based family planning waivers is because they increase the use of contraception. 
VI.  DISCUSSION 
A. Estimate of Cost per Birth Avoided 
  Since  waiver  programs  require  federal  expenditures  to  cover  the  cost  of  the  family 
planning services provided, a reasonable question is how much these services cost per birth 
avoided.  We can integrate our estimates along with outside information regarding the estimated 
cost  per  program  participant  to  arrive  at  this  figure.    According  to  the  Guttmacher  Institute 
                                                 
29 We attempted to reconcile this estimate with the estimated reduction in births obtained from Vital Statistics, but 
we ultimately concluded that such a comparison required too many unverifiable assumptions and the results of this 
exercise were sensitive to the parameter values we chose. In theory, if we had complete data on the likelihood of 
becoming pregnant in a given month in the absence of contraception (incorporating both biological capacity and 
frequency of sexual activity) and the intensity of contraceptive use along with its failure rate, we could simulate how 
an  increase  in  the  likelihood  of  using  contraception  would  alter  birth  rates.    Unfortunately,  our  measure  of 
contraceptive use – contraception at last intercourse in the past three months – is insufficient for that purpose.    
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(2007b),  public  spending  on  family  planning  services  totaled  $1.26  billion  in  FY  2001.  
According  to  Frost,  et  al.  (2004),  6.7  million  women  received  services  at  publicly  provided 
family planning clinics in 2001.  This means that the average cost per woman served is $188.  Of 
course, the cost estimate that we really need is the marginal cost of providing additional services 
to women brought into the program in the presence of waivers, but no such evidence exists.  
Instead, we will assume that there is a constant marginal cost and continue to use this $188 
figure. 
  We can combine this figure with the results provided in this paper to provide a ballpark 
estimate of the cost of these services per birth avoided.  Our analysis of MSIS data on Medicaid 
family planning receipt showed that income-based waivers increased the percentage of women 
receiving services by 5.4 percentage points (Table 2 – model with quadratic trends).  This means 
that for every 1,000 women of childbearing age, 54 more obtained family planning through 
Medicaid after the waiver than before.  The birth rate in those states in 1992, before the waivers, 
stood at a level of about 74 births per 1,000 women.  Our estimates in Table 3 suggest that 
income-based waivers reduced births by 2 percent, or about 1.5 births per year per 1,000 women.  
Combining these two estimates, we conclude that one birth was avoided for every 36 additional 
Medicaid family planning recipients.  At $188 per recipient, this means that the cost of avoiding 
one additional birth through an income-based waiver is roughly $6,800.  Earlier in the paper, we 
estimated that income-based family planning waivers had a 22 to 44 percent take-up rate.  This 
means that one birth was avoided for every 82 to 164 women made eligible. 
B. Impact of Waivers Compared to Other Interventions 
  An alternative framework for thinking about the impact of these waivers is to compare 
the reduction in fertility associated with them to that associated with other policy changes that  
23 
could accomplish this goal.  First, it is important to recognize that past attempts to increase 
contraceptive  use  generally  have  not  been  successful  in  reducing  teen  fertility,  as  described 
earlier.    Second,  the  most  recent  policy  measure  aimed  at  reducing  nonmarital  and/or  teen 
fertility  is  welfare  reform.
30    In  previous  work  we  have  found  that  family  cap  policies 
implemented as part of welfare reform in the early and mid 1990s were not effective at reducing 
birth rates among targeted women (Kearney 2004, Levine 2002.) In their extensive review of 
studies examining the impacts of welfare reform policies more generally, Grogger and Karoly 
(2005) conclude that “there is little evidence that welfare reform as a whole lowers childbearing” 
(p. 196).  
  More broadly, researchers have examined the incentive role of the welfare system on teen 
and nonmarital  childbearing. Moffitt (1998) reviews this literature and  reports that while no 
consensus exists on the magnitude of the impact, the wide range of point estimates across studies 
does suggest that there is some positive causal relationship between welfare benefits and the 
likelihood of female headship. This suggests some role, potentially quite modest, for lowering 
rates  of  fertility  through  a  reduction  in  benefits.  Third,  from  a  more  historical  perspective, 
abortion legalization in the early 1970s was one policy change that led to a significant reduction 
in (presumably unwanted) fertility, particularly among teens.  Levine, et al. (1999) finds that 
abortion legalization reduced overall fertility by 4 percent and teen fertility by 12 percent.
31  
With the exception of the greater impact associated with a radical policy change like abortion 
                                                 
30 It was an explicit goal of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 
1996 to reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock childbearing. 
31 These estimates are probably somewhat misleading because they incorporate travel between states that occurred 
during the period in which abortion was legal in some states, but not others.  Levine, et al. estimates that if there 
were no travel between states (i.e. moving from a total ban on abortion to legal abortion), the overall birth rate 
would have fallen by over ten percent.  Presumably, taking travel into account in estimating the teen fertility effect 
would also lead to a substantially higher estimate.  
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legalization, our estimates indicate that family planning waivers represent a relatively successful 
attempt at reducing rates of (presumably unwanted) births. 
C. Contribution to Decline in Teen Fertility Rate 
  Earlier, we discussed the fact that teen fertility rates declined dramatically since the early 
1990s, falling from a rate of 60.3 births per 1,000 women aged 15-19 in 1990 to a rate of 43.0 in 
2002 (Guttmacher  Institute, 2006).  We also know that the introduction of an income-based 
family planning waiver is estimated to reduce the teen birth rate by 4.2 percent (in a model with 
quadratic state trends).  Although the impact of the waivers was substantial, they clearly can 
explain very little of the downward trend in teen fertility.  Over our sample period, only 22 
percent of teens live in the seven states instituting income-based waivers by 2002.  This means 
that the national teen birth rate would be predicted to decline by .22￿.042￿60.3 = .56, or 3 percent 
of the overall decline. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
  This study took advantage of the quasi-experiment inherent in the waiver process that 
allowed  some  states  to  expand  access  to  contraception  for  some  women.    We  began  by 
presenting evidence that these income-based waivers did indeed increase the number of women 
receiving family planning services through Medicaid by two to three times.  We then reported 
the results of models for teens and non-teens, which showed that births fell as a result.  Income-
based waivers were found to reduce births by 1.7 to 2 percent for non-teens and 4.2 to 4.7 
percent for teens.  Incorporating information on predicted increases in eligibility brought about 
by state income-based waiver policies, we estimate that births fell by 8.9 percent among newly-
eligible women age 20-44. We further document that this impact can be attributed to increased 
contraceptive use among sexually-active women.    
25 
We used the results of our analysis to show that income-based family planning waivers 
reduced one birth for every 36 additional Medicaid family planning recipients.  Combining this 
with external information regarding the cost of family planning provision, we estimate the cost 
of preventing an unwanted birth to be around $6,800.  Based on our review of other interventions 
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Table 1:  States with Section 1115 Medicaid Family Planning Waivers 
      Basis for Eligibility 






for Any Reason 
 
Based Solely on 
Income (FPL) 
Alabama  7/1/2000  10/1/2000      133% of poverty 
Arizona  4/1/1995  8/1/1995  2 years     
Arkansas  6/18/1996  9/1/1997      200% 
California  1/1/1997  1/1/1997      200% 
Delaware  5/17/1995  1/1/1996    2 years   
Florida  8/23/1998  9/1/1998  2 years     
Illinois  6/23/2003  4/1/2004    5 years   
Iowa  1/10/2006  2/1/2006      200% 
Louisiana  6/6/2006  7/1/2006      200% 
Maryland  12/5/1994  2/1/1995  5 years     
Michigan  3/1/2006  7/1/2006      185% 
Minnesota  7/20/2004  7/1/2006      200% 
Mississippi  1/31/2003  10/1/2003      185% 
Missouri  4/29/1998  2/1/1999  1 year     
New Mexico  8/1/1997  7/1/1998      185% 
New York  9/27/2002  10/1/2002      200% 
New York  9/27/2002  10/1/2002  2 years     
North Carolina  11/5/2004  11/5/2005      185% 
Oklahoma  11/5/2004  4/1/2005      185% 
Oregon  10/14/1998  1/1/1999      185% 
Rhode Island  11/1/1993  8/1/1994  2 years     
South Carolina  1/1997  7/1/1997      185% 
South Carolina  12/1993  7/1/1994  2 years     
Texas  12/21/2006  1/1/2007      185% 
Virginia  7/22/2002  10/1/2002  2 years     
Washington  3/6/2001  7/1/2001      200% 
Wisconsin  6/14/2002  1/1/2003      185% 
Notes:  Waivers in Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, New Mexico, North Carolina, and Oklahoma are restricted to individuals age 19 and older. 
The dates for California correspond to policies funded by the state; federal financing of these waiver policies commenced two years later.  
Sources: Frost, et al. (2006), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_MFPW.pdf (accessed 9/28/05),  
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/medicaid/waivers/waivermap.asp (accessed 9/28/05), and Guttmacher Institute (2006) 
<http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_SMFPE.pdf> (accessed 9/2/06). 
 
Table 2:  Impact of Waivers on the Number of Medicaid Family Planning Clients as a Proportion 
of the Female Population Age 15-44  
   
Mean Proportion 
Medicaid FP 











Income-Based Waiver  0.046  0.116  0.088  0.053 
    (0.027)  (0.024)  (0.013) 
         
Duration-Based Waiver  0.037  -0.006  0.013  0.012 
    (0.007)  (0.011)  (0.008) 
              
Neither  0.044  ---  ---  --- 
         
Number of Observations  ---  538  538  538 
Notes:  Columns (2) to (4) report results from separate regressions where the dependent variable is the proportion of 
the female population age 15-44 who received Medicaid family planning services.  All regressions control for state 
and year fixed effects, the state unemployment rate, the maximum welfare benefit for a family of three in the state-
year, and whether the following policies were in place in the respondent' s state at the beginning of the survey year – 
welfare family cap, TANF, SCHIP, Medicaid coverage of abortion, abortion parental notification requirements, 
abortion delay rules, and mandated private health insurance coverage of family planning services. They also control 
for the percent of the state-year female population in the following demographic groups: married, white, Hispanic, 
four education groups, and age 15-17, 18-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, and 35-39. All regressions are weighted by the 
population of women age 15 to 44 in the state and year. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the state level.  
Data  on  Medicaid  family  planning  beneficiaries  for  the  years  1999-2002  are  from  the  Medicaid  Statistical 
Information System (MSIS), downloaded from http://www.cms.hhs.gov in December 2006. Comparable data for 
1992-1998 comes from national HFCA-2082 tables, graciously provided to us by Kosali Simon. 
 
 
   
 
Table 3:  Impact of Medicaid Family Planning Waivers on Births and Abortions 
for Teens and Non-Teens 
   
 
Teens (15-19) 
   
Births:  Non-Teens (20-44) 
Abortions:  All Women (15-44) 




























Income-Based Waiver    -0.071  -0.047  -0.042    -0.053  -0.017  -0.020 
Implemented  (0.024)  (0.013)  (0.014)    (0.012)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
               
Duration-Based Waiver  0.002  -0.008  0.014    -0.016  -0.016  -0.007 
Implemented  (0.020)  (0.015)  (0.010)    (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.006) 
               
Number of Observations  637  637  637    663  663  663 
   
Abortions 
 
Income-Based Waiver    -0.085  0.064  0.175    -0.039  0.121  0.075 
Implemented  (0.065)  (0.102)  (0.159)    (0.035)  (0.055)  (0.087) 
               
Duration-Based Waiver  0.010  -0.073  -0.040    0.064  0.012  -0.071 
Implemented  (0.055)  (0.065)  (0.138)    (0.049)  (0.048)  (0.090) 
               
Number of Observations  196  196  196    255  255  255 
Notes:  Each column represents the results from separate regressions on the log of the birth or abortion rate in 
models that also include the following control variables:  the unemployment rate, indicators for whether welfare 
reforms were implemented (including pre-TANF waivers) and for whether the reforms included a family cap, the 
maximum AFDC/TANF benefit for a family of three, an indicator for whether S-CHIP was implemented in the 
state,  indicator  variables  for  whether  there  are  laws  restricting  abortion  access  by  creating  mandatory  delays, 
requiring some form of parental involvement for minors, and restriction on Medicaid funding for abortions, an 
indicator for whether states have comprehensive contraception coverage, variables measuring the percentage of the 
state’s  population  that  is  married,  white,  Hispanic.  Regressions  for  women  20-44  also  include  the  following 
education and age controls: high school dropout, high school graduate, attended some college and between the ages 
of 15-17, 18-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, and 35-39.  For the teenage regressions, observations from Alabama and New 
Mexico  are  dropped  from  the  analysis  sample  because  these  states  implemented  income-based  waivers  that 
explicitly did not apply to women under the age of 19.  All regressions are weighted by the relevant population of 
women in the state and year. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis and are adjusted for clustering at the state 
level.  
 
Table 4:  Impact of Medicaid Family Planning Waivers on Overall Births  



















Based Waiver on 
Eligible Women in 
Group 
(4) 
Age group         
Age 15-17  -0.012  0.019  ---  --- 
  (0.014)  (0.011)     
         
Age 18-19  -0.068  0.014  ---  --- 
  (0.018)  (0.016)     
         
Age 20-24  -0.051  0.014  34.4  -0.148 
  (0.021)  (0.016)     
         
Age 25-34  -0.009  -0.001  21.9  -0.041 
  (0.006)  (0.009)     
         
Age 35-44  -0.007  -0.013  18.1  -0.039 
  (0.013)  (0.008)     
         
Age 20-44  -0.020  -0.007  22.5  -0.089 
   (0.009)  (0.006)     
         
Race/ethnicity         
White, non-Hispanic  -0.010  -0.006  19.3  -0.041 
  (0.007)  (0.008)     
         
Black, non-Hispanic  -0.013  0.002  32.1  -0.040 
  (0.021)  (0.008)     
         
Hispanic  -0.029  0.029  31.2  -0.093 
  (0.010)  (0.023)     
         
Education         
High School Dropouts  -0.038  -0.052  36.8  -0.103 
  (0.013)  (0.022)     
         
High School Graduates  -0.028  -0.015  27.0  -0.104 
  (0.009)  (0.007)     
         
Some College  -0.003  -0.010  20.3  -0.015 
  (0.008)  (0.015)     
         
College Graduates  -0.007  -0.016  10.1  -0.069 
  (0.007)  (0.008)     
Notes:  Each row in Columns 1 and 2 represents the results from separate regressions where the dependent variable 
is the log of the birth rate (by age and race) or the log of the number of births (by education) in models that all 
include state-specific quadratic trends.  In Column 3, statistics reflect the estimated percentage of the population that 
is eligible for income-based waivers in those states with such waivers in the 2000 Census.  Statistics in Column 4 
reflect the simulated impact of income-based waivers on the eligible population, which is the coefficient in Column 
1 divided by the percentage (divided by 100) in Column 3.  See notes to Table 3 for additional X variables in all 
regressions and other comments.  
 
  
Table 5:  Sexual Activity and Contraception Use by Race/Ethnicity 
 
 
Ages: 15-19    Ages: 15-44 
 
 
1988  1995  2002    1988  1995  2002 
 
 
Sexual Activity in Past 3 Months 
 
All  0.43  0.40  0.36    0.78  0.77  0.72 
White NH  0.43  0.40  0.38    0.79  0.79  0.74 
Black NH  0.51  0.46  0.35    0.79  0.77  0.68 
Hispanic  0.31  0.45  0.31    0.72  0.73  0.70 
 
 
No Contraception Use during Last Intercourse in Past Three Months 
(Conditional on Sexual Activity) 
 
All  0.23  0.32  0.17    0.22  0.25  0.24 
White NH  0.20  0.30  0.11    0.20  0.23  0.21 
Black NH  0.32  0.30  0.26    0.28  0.29  0.31 
Hispanic  0.31  0.47  0.37    0.28  0.32  0.31 
 
 
Sexually Active in Past Three Months and No Contraception Used at Last Intercourse 
 
All  0.10  0.12  0.06    0.17  0.19  0.17 
White NH  0.09  0.11  0.04    0.16  0.18  0.16 
Black NH  0.16  0.14  0.09    0.22  0.22  0.21 
Hispanic  0.10  0.20  0.12    0.20  0.23  0.22 
Source: National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG) 
 
 
Table 6:  Impact of Waivers on Sexual Activity and Contraceptive Use 
 
Sex in past 3 months 
(1) 
 
No Birth Control During Last 
Intercourse in Past 3 Months 
(2) 
Unprotected Sex in  
Past 3 Months 
(3) 
 
Non-Teens (20-44):  n = 23,123 
 
Income-Based Waiver   0.045  -0.064  -0.043 
  (0.028)  (0.029)  (0.025) 
       
Duration-Based Waiver  -0.001  0.013  0.009 
  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.024) 
 
Teens (15-19):  N = 3,800 
 
Income-Based Waiver  -0.178     0.002  -0.022    
  (0.053)  (0.128)  (0.048) 
       
Duration-Based Waiver  -0.196     0.048  -0.009    
  (0.055)  (0.073)  (0.031) 
 
Non-Teens (20-44):  n = 23,123 
 
Income-Based Waiver  0.043  -0.051  -0.034 
  (0.025)  (0.029)  (0.024) 
       
Income-Based Waiver*  0.009  -0.054  -0.035 
Predicted Eligibility  (0.026)  (0.018)  (0.017) 
       
Duration-Based Waiver  -0.004  0.011  0.008 
  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.025) 
Notes: The top two panels report the results of estimating equation (2) with indicator variables for a main waiver 
effect for each type of waiver included in the model. For non-teen women, we additionally estimate a model that 
interacts  an  indicator  for  an  income-based  waiver  with  another  variable  indicating  whether  the  individual  is 
predicted to be covered by the waiver.  These regressions are reported in the third panel.  Standard errors are 
adjusted for clustering at the state level and are reported in parenthesis. All regressions control for the following 
individual demographics: age group (where appropriate), race/ethnic group (where appropriate), education group 
(except  for  teens),  marital  status,  and  whether  the  respondent  has  any  children  living  in  her  household.  All 
regressions also control for the state-year unemployment rate, the maximum welfare benefit for a family of three in 
the state-year, whether a welfare family cap was in place in the respondent' s state at the beginning of the survey 
year, year effects, and state fixed effects. Observations are weighted by NSFG survey weights. For the teenage 
regressions, observations from Alabama and New Mexico are dropped from the analysis sample because these 




Appendix Table 1: Form of Last Birth Control among Sexually Active Women 
    Percent of women using method, conditional on contraceptive use 
 
Percent using any 
method at last 
intercourse   
Natural 







      (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
All women  74.3    6.1  19.6  28.4  5.4  2.9  37.6 
(n=18,602 )                 
Teens  74.2    6.2  40.9  44.6  1.6  6.2  0.5 
(n=1,410 )                 
Non-teens  74.3    6.1  17.7  26.9  5.7  2.6  40.9 
(n=17,192 )                 
Unmarried  77.4    5.8  25.4  38.9  4.4  4.4  21.1 
(n=7,816 )                 
Less than HS  68.3    4.4  13.8  17.2  4.9  4.3  55.3 
(n= 3,221 )                 
White non-Hispanic  76.8    6.1  18.5  29.2  5.4  2.2  38.6 
(n=11,017 )                 
Black non-Hispanic  69.7    3.8  20.5  27.6  4.6  5.3  38.3 
(n= 4,503 )                 
Hispanics  65.1    7.3  22.0  25.9  5.6  5.8  33.3 
(n= 2,502 )                 
No Children in Household  72.7    6.2  25.6  44.0  4.7  2.2  17.3 
(n= 6,530 )                 
Children in Household  75.2    6.1  16.0  19.0  5.8  3.4  49.8 
(n=12,072 )                 
 